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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW
New York Court of Appeals declares an open field posted with
"No Trespassing" signs protected from warrantless searches and
seizures under the New York State Constitution
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution,'
mirrored in Article I, Section 12 of the New York State Constitu-
tion, protects citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures
of their persons and property.2 The nature and scope of protection
afforded property has, over the years, been defined by the courts.3
1 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Id.
2See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. As the language contained in the New York State Con-
stitution is identical to the Fourth Amendment, the rights conferred are similar. See People
v. Harris, 77 N.Y.2d 434, 437, 570 N.E.2d 1051, 1053, 568 N.Y.S.2d 702, 704 (1991). Al-
though there is no question that New York courts are bound by the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court when reviewing federal statutes or applying the United States Consti-
tution, see, e.g., People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 296, 303, 501 N.E.2d 556, 559, 508
N.Y.S.2d 907, 911 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987), the state courts may exercise
their sovereign powers when interpreting state statutes or the state constitution, provided
no rights guaranteed citizens under the United States Constitution are curtailed. Id. States
may supplement or expand the provisions of the Constitution so long as no conflict arises.
Id.; see also Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (holding that states may
recognize individual liberties broader than those conferred by Constitution); Cooper v. Cali-
fornia, 386 U.S. 58 (1967) (recognizing state's right to impose more restrictive standards
regarding searches and seizures than required under Constitution). The trend in New York
has been to expand the scope of the rights afforded its citizens by interpreting art. I, § 12
more liberally than the Fourth Amendment. See People v. Class, 67 N.Y.2d 431, 433, 494
N.E.2d 444, 445, 503 N.Y.S.2d 313, 314 (1986) (declining to follow United States Supreme
Court's position regarding nonconsensual entry into automobile to search for vehicle identi-
fication number); P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d at 304-05, 501 N.E.2d at 561-62, 508 N.Y.S.2d at
913-14 (adopting more stringent standards than Fourth Amendment for issuing of search
warrant); People v. Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398, 406, 488 N.E.2d 439, 445, 497 N.Y.S.2d 618, 624
(1985) (declining to apply Supreme Court's "totality of circumstances" test for determining
probable cause); People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 426-27, 488 N.E.2d 451, 457, 497
N.Y.S.2d 630, 636-37 (1985) (declining to follow "good-faith exception").
3 See, e.g., Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (holding Fourth Amendment
protection did not extend to open fields). The rationale of the Court was that the express
language of the Fourth Amendment--"persons, houses, papers, and effects"-did not in-
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:429
In recent years, for example, government drug agents have been
permitted to conduct warrantless searches of privately owned land
outside the curtilage4 of the home to uncover illegally grown sub-
stances.5 The United States Supreme Court has held that despite
posting "No Trespassing" signs on land in a secluded area, an
owner of open fields may not legitimately expect privacy for activi-
ties conducted in areas not close to the home.6 The Court has rea-
soned that since the literal protections afforded by the Fourth
Amendment do not extend beyond protecting people in their "per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects,"' any additional Fourth Amend-
ment protection must be based on expectations that are societally
reasonable; accordingly, an accessible open field would not be pro-
tected.8 Recently, however, in People v. Scott,9 the New York
clude open fields. Id. This case focused on the property concept of trespass to determine
whether a search had occurred. Id. However, in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967),
finding that electronic surveillance of a public telephone booth constituted a search, the
majority rejected the traditional property concepts, which after Hester had become the ba-
sis for Fourth Amendment inquiry, and instead recognized that the Fourth Amendment was
designed to protect persons and not places. Id. at 351. Courts have since relied on the more
extensive inquiry set forth by Justice Harlan's concurrence: "[f]irst that a person have ex-
hibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be
one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 384 (6th ed. 1990). Curtilage, for search and seizure
purposes, is defined as that area which is directly and intimately connected with the habita-
tion. Id.
I See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984). In Oliver, the Court held that the
owner of an open field outside of the private residence and curtilage is not among those
protected under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 178-79; see also People v. Joubert, 118 Cal.
App. 3d 637, 642-48, 173 Cal. Rprt. 428, 431-35 (1981) (applying open fields doctrine to
determine whether binocular-aided aerial search of cultivated area of marihuana on defend-
ant's open field was constitutionally permissible).
6 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178. The Court, after reviewing the concept of curtilage from com-
mon law, used it to define the extent of the open fields doctrine. Id. at 176-81. In Oliver,
despite prominent "No Trespassing" signs and a locked gate at the entrance, two narcotics
agents of the Kentucky State Police conducted a warrantless search of a farm where mari-
huana was reportedly being grown. Id. at 172. Walking along a foot path which led around
the locked gate, the agents observed a field of marihuana over a mile from the defendant's
home. Id. at 173. The majority upheld the search as constitutional because the Fourth
Amendment only protects one's home and its curtilage, which does not include open fields.
Id. at 176-81. A legitimate expectation is determined by whether the government's intrusion
infringes upon the personal and societal values which the Fourth Amendment was designed
to safeguard. Id. at 182-84.
7 Id. at 176-77 (quoting Hester, 265 U.S. at 59).
8 Id. at 177-81. Because open fields are accessible to the public and police in ways that
a home, office, or commercial structure would not be, and because fences or "No Trespass-
ing" signs do not effectively bar the public from viewing open fields, the asserted expecta-
tion of privacy in open fields is not one society recognizes as reasonable. Id. The Oliver
Court also stated that the determination of reasonable expectations on a case-by-case basis
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Court of Appeals held that a warrantless search of an open field,
conducted by police when "No Trespassing" signs were clearly visi-
ble, violated the New York State Constitution."0
In Scott, after obtaining information from a witness that mari-
huana plants were being grown1" on a portion of the one hundred
was not workable, therefore, the bright-line rule established by removing open fields from
the protection of the Fourth Amendment was superior. Id. at 182. See generally Eric D.
Bender, Note, The Fourth Amendment in the Age of Aerial Surveillance: Curtains for the
Curtilage?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 725, 738-39 (1985) (stating that Oliver reaffirmed open fields
doctrine of Hester, which has held open fields per se unprotected in reliance on explicit
Fourth Amendment language).
9 79 N.Y.2d 474, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1992).
10 Id. at 489, 593 N.E.2d at 1337, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 930. The general principle is that a
state court may find that its state constitution extends greater protection to its citizens from
state action than does the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S.
117 (1945). "This Court from the time of its foundation has' adhered to the principle that it
will not review judgments of state courts that arrest on adequate and independent state
grounds." Id. at 125; see also A.E. Dick Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in
the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REv. 873, 876 (1976) (examining areas where state
constitutions have been construed differently from U.S. Constitution).
That these judgments are not subject to Supreme Court review based on the indepen-
dent grounds has been seen as a great advantage to adjudicating in state courts. See Paul
M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv.
605 n.1 (1981). While the authority of a state court to construe a provision in its constitu-
tion differently than the Supreme Court is not disputed, views on the subject differ. See
Howard, supra, at 898. Some courts feel strongly that they must look to prior decisions of
the Supreme Court which have interpreted the Fourth Amendment, for example, notwith-
standing any prior decisions by that state's courts. Id.; see also Hughes v. State, 522 P.2d
1331, 1333-34 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974) ("elementary" to look to Supreme Court decisions).
Other courts would consider adopting the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitu-
tion if similar state constitutional provisions are at issue. See Howard, supra, at 898. "A
third approach is to give independent consideration to the state constitutional claim on its
own merits," which could result in the state requiring more or less exacting standards than
the Supreme Court. Id. at 899. In fact, more state courts are now construing their identically
phrased Bill of Rights counterparts as affording their citizens greater protections. See Wil-
liam J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitution and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv.
L. REv. 489, 495 (1977). "This is surely an important and highly significant development for
our constitutional jurisprudence and for our concept of federalism." Id. This expansion has
occurred in many circumstances, and this pattern "puts to rest the notion that state consti-
tutional provisions were adopted to mirror the federal Bill of Rights." Id. at 501. Advocates
believe the Supreme Court decisions are not dispositive of all questions arising under com-
parable state provisions. Id. at 502. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AmERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 32-42 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing legitimacy of differing interpretations of
Constitution).
1 People v. Scott, 169 A.D.2d 1023, 1024, 565 N.Y.S.2d 576, 576 (3d Dep't 1991), rev'd,
79 N.Y.2d 474, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1992). A private citizen, Collar, was
hunting and followed a wounded deer that he had shot onto the defendant's property. Id.
Collar observed a pond structure on the hillside, two plastic fifty-gallon drums, and camou-
flage with brown spots underneath overhanging branches. Id. From this information, Collar
"surmised" that the defendant was growing marihuana. Id. Upon a second entry to the land,
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sixty-five acres of uncultivated fields and woodlands owned by the
defendant,1 2 the police requested that the witness return to the
property and obtain a leaf from one of the plants.13 The property
was conspicuously marked with "No Trespassing" signs every
twenty to thirty feet around its perimeter. 14 After determining that
marihuana was being grown, the police were able to procure a
search warrant 15 and entered the defendant's property.' 6 Facing
conviction for illegally growing marihuana, the defendant moved to
suppress the evidence that had been seized during the searches.17
He asserted that the fact that he had posted "No Trespassing"
signs demonstrated that he had a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy with respect to his property, and that he should be entitled to
protection under both the United States and New York State Con-
stitutions. 8 The defendant's motion to suppress was denied by the
county court of Chenago County 9 and the defendant subsequently
Collar observed marihuana plants, as well as a man with a gun strapped to his shoulder. Id.
at 1025, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 577.
12 Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 478-79, 593 N.E.2d at 1330, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 922. The property
was described by the court as consisting of "165 acres of rural, hilly, undeveloped, unculti-
vated fields and woodlands," with the only exception being the crop of marihuana cultivated
by the defendant. Id.
's Id. After the police witness's second entry onto the defendant's land, he informed the
New York State Police that he had witnessed the cultivation of approximately fifty mari-
huana plants. Id. After the witness had retrieved a leaf from the property, an investigator
from the state police entered the defendant's property along with the witness to personally
observe the plants. Id. The three entries onto the property were all without the defendant's
awareness or permission. Id.
-14 Id. at 478, 593 N.E.2d at 1330, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 922. The defendant lived in a mobile
home on a portion of the land; the marijuana plants were grown about 300-400 yards away.
Id. at 479, 593 N.E.2d at 1331, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 923.
1' Id. at 479, 593 N.E.2d at 1330, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 922. Thd application for the warrant
included the "in camera" testimony of the witness, Collar; investigator Hyman's personal
knowledge of the marihuana being grown; an anonymous phone call made to the Sheriff's
Department reporting the cultivation of marihuana on the defendant's land; and research of
the Chenago County tax maps to establish that the defendant owned the property. Id.
16 Id.
I Id. at 478-79, 593 N.E.2d at 1330, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
18 Id. The defendant argued that the extent of the owner's legitimate expectation of
privacy can be discerned in part by looking to the effort made by the defendant to keep
members of the public off the property. Id.; see also N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12 (explaining
that under New York State Constitution, protection is based on individual's expectation of
privacy, not type of place for which privacy is asserted).
19 Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 479, 593 N.E.2d at 1331, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 923. The hearing court
relied on the rationale in Oliver and concluded that the intrusion by the police did not go
against the values that society deemed protected by the Fourth Amendment, nor did it
violate art. I, § 12 of the New York State Constitution. Id.
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pleaded guilty to first degree possession of marihuana. ° On appeal,
the Appellate Division, Third Department, affirmed the
conviction.2
The New York Court of Appeals seized upon its authority to
conduct an independent review of the case in an effort to deter-
mine whether the protections afforded citizens under the Fourth
Amendment were adequate under the New York State Constitu-
tion.22 Judge Hancock, writing for the majority in the Scott case,
explained that although the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights
had not been violated under the rationale set forth by the Supreme
20 Scott, 169 A.D.2d at 1024, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 576. The court held that the posting of a
sign on rural property like the defendant's was not enough to create a protectable privacy
interest. Id.
21 Id. at 1026, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 577.
22 A consolidated action combined the Scott case with People v. Keta, 165 A.D.2d 172,
567 N.Y.S.2d 738 (2d Dep't 1991), rev'd, 79 N.Y.2d 474, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920
(1992), which considered whether a vehicle dismantling shop could be searched without a
warrant. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 492, 593 N.E.2d at 1339, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 931. In Keta, pursu-
ant to VTL § 415-a(5)(a), the shop was inspected by members of the Auto Crime Division
of the New York City Police Department. Id. VTL § 415-a(5)(a) provides, in pertinent part:
Upon request of an agent of the commissioner or of any police officer and during
his regular and usual business hours, a vehicle dismantler shall produce such
records and permit said agent or police officer to examine them and any vehicles
or parts of vehicle which are subject to the record keeping requirements of this
section and which are on the premises.
VTL § 415-a(5)(a) (McKinney 1986). The statute permits the inspection without a search
warrant. During the inspection, the defendant was asked to produce his "police book," a log
in which the statute requires a dismantler to keep records of all purchases and sales of
vehicle parts after a random selection of vehicle identification numbers revealed stolen
parts. Keta, 165 A.D.2d at 175, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 739. The defendant was placed under arrest
after a more detailed search of the premises revealed a greater number of stolen parts. Id.
As in the Scott case, the defendant made a motion to suppress the evidence, after having
been charged with criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree, grand larceny,
and falsifying business records. Id., 567 N.Y.S.2d at 740. The defendant's motion was
granted; however, a divided Appellate Division reversed. Id. at 177, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 741.
The basis for the reversal was that the United States Supreme Court had already upheld
the validity of VTL § 415-a(5)(a) against a Fourth Amendment challenge. See id.; New
York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987). The facts of Burger are almost identical to Keta. In
Burger, members of the Auto Crime Division, pursuant to VTL § 415-a(5)(a) randomly in-
spected several auto shops. Id. at 693-94. After it was determined that the parts had been
stolen, the defendant attempted to suppress the evidence on the ground that VTL § 415-
a(5)(a) was unconstitutional. Id. at 696. The New York Court of Appeals determined that
this violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. The United States Supreme Court later upheld
the constitutionality of VTL § 415-a(5)(a), reversing the Court of Appeals. Id. at 708-12.
The Court determined that an owner of a business within *a closely regulated industry has a
reduced expectation of privacy. Id. at 707. With "[s]ufficient reasons appearing, a state
court may adopt a different construction of a similar State provision unconstrained by a
contrary Supreme Court interpretation of the Federal counterpart." Id.; People v. Harris, 77
N.Y.2d 434, 437, 570 N.E.2d 1051, 1053, 568 N.Y.S.2d 702, 704 (1991).
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Court in Oliver v. United States,23 it was necessary to ascertain
whether the New York State Constitution provided broader pro-
tection.2 4 Judge Hancock concluded that Oliver seemed directly at
odds with the basic concept developed in an earlier Supreme Court
decision, Katz v. United States,25 that the Fourth Amendment
protects a person's privacy interests rather than particular places,
and "more particularly, it protects people from unreasonable gov-
ernment intrusions into areas where they have expectations of pri-
vacy."26 Based on this conclusion, the Scott court expressly re-
jected the Oliver rationale, 7 and held that citizens are entitled to
2 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
24 Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 480-81, 593 N.E.2d at 1331-32, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 923-24. The
Court of Appeals has, in the past, adopted more protective rules under the state constitu-
tion. Id.; see supra note 2 (discussing circumstances where court perceived need for more
stringent search and seizure standard than provided by Supreme Court); see also People v.
Reynolds, 71 N.Y.2d 552, 556, 523 N.E.2d 291, 293, 528 N.Y.S.2d 15, 17 (1988) (principles of
federalism secure state's right to afford its citizens greater insulation from government in-
trusion than guaranteed under Fourth Amendment); People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d
296, 302, 501 N.E.2d 556, 560, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907, 911 (1986) (declining to read Fourth
Amendment and art. 1, § 12 as coextensive and requiring more exacting standard for issu-
ance of search warrants), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987). However, the Reynolds court
cautioned that a state's right to provide greater protection should not be exercised exces-
sively because the "identity of language [in the two clauses] supports a policy of uniformity
between State and Federal courts." Id. at 304, 501 N.E.2d at 561, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
U 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, the petitioner was tried and convicted of using a tele-
phone to communicate information regarding betting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1084. Id. at
348. The Federal Bureau of Investigation had placed an electronic recording device on a
public telephone booth from which the petitioner had made phone calls. Id. This evidence
was deemed admissible, and the petitioner claimed a violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights. Id. at 349. The petitioner asserted that the phone booth was a "constitutionally pro-
tected area," and therefore the FBI was not permitted to invade the booth. Id. Although the
Court reversed the conviction, it stated that the petitioner had formulated the issue in a
misleading fashion. Id. at 351. The Court stressed that "the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places," and thus the issue was not how the phone booth was characterized. Id.
at 351-53. "The Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording the peti-
tioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the tele-
phone booth and thus constituted a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment." Id. at 353. The next question to be addressed was whether the search and
seizure "complied with constitutional standards." Id. at 354. Because the surveillance failed
to meet the necessary prerequisite of probable cause, the petitioner's Fourth Amendment
rights were violated. Id. at 357-59. "Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he
will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures." Id. at 359; see also supra note 3
(discussing Katz decision).
2" Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 485, 593 N.E.2d at 1334, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 926 (quoting United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977)). The majority in Scott grounded its decision on the
second prong of the Katz test, that a legitimate expectation of privacy which society would
recognize as reasonable was present in the case at bar. Id. at 486, 593 N.E.2d at 1335, 583
N.Y.S.2d at 927.
"' Id. at 489, 593 N.E.2d at 1337, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 929 ("[W]e do not find the Oliver
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greater protection under the New York State Constitution.2 The
court determined that society would view the defendant's privacy
expectations as reasonable.2 9 Thus, the court found that under the
rule of Katz and the laws of New York, the defendant possessed a
protectable privacy interest.30 Accordingly, it held that the search
of defendant's property under the circumstances violated the New
York State Constitution.3 1
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Bellacosa, joined by Chief Judge
Court's reasoning acceptable as a justification under article I, § 12 for a nonconsensual gov-
ernmental search of properly posted or fenced land outside the curtilage.").
28 Id. at 436, 593 N.E.2d at 1335, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 927.
29 Id. The idea that the ownership of property was an acknowledgement by society that
a person would be able to act as he wished on his land was central to the holding of the
Scott court. Id.
30 Id. at 438, 593 N.E.2d at 1336, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 929. ("Our Court, in applying both
federal and state law, has consistently adhered to the concept introduced in Katz: that the
Fourth Amendment and article I, § 12 protect the privacy rights of persons, not places.").
According to the Scott court, a return to the "Oliver majority's pre-Katz, property-oriented
approach" would effectively undermine "New York's acceptance of article I, § 12 and the
Fourth Amendment as affording protection not to places, but to an individual's legitimate
expectation of privacy." Id. The court also found support from Justice Brandeis's "right to
be left alone" theory put forth in his dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438 (1928). Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 486-87, 593 N.E.2d at 1335, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 927. The
majority observed that this right is "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men." Id. (quoting Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478). It pointed out that this
right had been "reflected" in prior cases outside of the scope of search and seizure. Id. The
majority went on to "hold that where landowners fence or post 'No Trespassing' signs on
their private property or, by some other means, indicate unmistakably that entry is not
permitted, the expectation that their privacy rights will be respected and that they will be
free from unwanted intrusions is reasonable." Id. at 491, 593 N.E.2d at 1338, 583 N.Y.S.2d
at 930. Rejecting the Oliver court's assumption that law-abiding citizens would have no le-
gitimate reason to hide anything on open property and consequently a property owner
would have no reasonable objection to an unauthorized search of posted land, the court
instead relied on New York's tradition of tolerance. Id. at 488, 593 N.E.2d at 1337, 583
N.Y.S.2d at 929. Accordingly, the court reasoned, because society is not a conforming one,
even law-abiding citizens may have good reasons for wishing privacy for their activities. Id.
at 488-89, 593 N.E.2d at 1337, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 929; see also Oliver, 466 U.S. at 192 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting) (discussing various ways in which privately owned woods and fields are
used that society would recognize as reasonably deserving privacy, including walks, agricul-
tural business, and worshipping).
22 Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 488-89, 593 N.E.2d at 1337, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 929. A few years
earlier, in People v. Reynolds, 71 N.Y.2d 552, 556, 523 N.E.2d 291, 292-93, 528 N.Y.S.2d 15,
16-17 (1988), the court had expressly declined to address whether article I, § 12 protection
was established by "No Trespassing" signs or other indications of an intent to exclude the
public from privately owned, open land. The Reynolds case involved ground and aerial
searches of the defendant's property after receiving an anonymous tip that marihuana was
being cultivated. Id. at 555, 523 N.E.2d at 292, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 16. The court upheld a later
warrantless search against an article I, § 12 challenge. Id. ("We hold.., that governmental
intrusion upon or aboVe such land without a warrant is not constitutionally prohibited.").
19931
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Wachtler and Judge Simons, attacked the majority for creating a
"pervasive, all-encompassing privacy essence," which broke from
"the traditional expectation of privacy attribute" employed in the
past.2 Judge Bellacosa argued that because the court failed to ap-
ply a noninterpretative analysis, a sweeping precedential change
had occurred which effectively provided no guidance for future
search and seizure cases posing state constitutional questions. 33
In pursuit of the preservation of fundamental rights of New
York citizens, it is submitted that the Scott court correctly de-
clined to adopt the Supreme Court's position in Oliver. By utiliz-
ing the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test articulated in
Katz,34 the court has eliminated the open fields doctrine and pre-
scribed broad privacy rights for New Yorkers. 5 However, in doing
so, the court failed to establish guidelines or standards for law en-
forcement officials searching open land. As a result, law enforce-
ment agencies will not know whether they are acting within the
bounds of the New York State Constitution.
It is submitted that a superior approach would have been to
32 Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 513, 593 N.E.2d at 1353, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 945 (Bellacosa, J., dis-
senting). The main focus of this scathing dissent was criticism of the majority's failure to
articulate "sufficient reasons" for its departure from the Supreme Court. Id. at 510, 593
N.E.2d at 1350, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 943. In light of the fact that the language of the two clauses
is identical, and a like decision would not unsettle prior New York law, the dissent argued
that the rules set forth by the Supreme Court should be given greater respect. Id. at 511-12,
593 N.E.2d at 1352, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 944. For an example of the weight previously given to
Supreme Court decisions, see People v. Gustafson, 101 A.D.2d 920, 475 N.Y.S.2d 913 (3d
Dep't 1984) (reaffirming open field doctrine in light of Oliver decision). The dissent also
stressed the importance of federal and state uniformity. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 515, 593 N.E.2d
at 1354, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 946.
33 Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 512-13, 593 N.E.2d at 1352, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 944 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting). "This approach wholly swallows up the non-interpretative analytical principle
and substitutes a vacuum of guidance to the lower courts in place of the useful and proper
guidance that was available." Id. In a non-interpretative analysis, the court focuses not on
the text of the clause, but on matters peculiar to the state, and should consider factors such
as:
any pre-existing State statutory or common law defining the scope of the individ-
ual right in question; the history and traditions of the State in its protection of
the individual right; any identification of the right in the State Constitution as
being one of peculiar State or local concern; and any distinctive attitudes of the
state citizenry toward the definition, scope or protection of the individual right.
People v. P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d 296, 303, 501 N.E.2d 556, 560, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907, 911 (1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987).
31 See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing various aspects of Katz case);
see also supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing court's application of Katz test).
" See Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 486, 593 N.E.2d at 1335, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 927 ("We believe
that under the law of this State the citizens are entitled to more protection.").
SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
balance the societal interest in prevention of illegal activities
against the minimal level of intrusiveness suffered in a search of
open fields as compared with the curtilage of one's home. Courts
have attempted to achieve an adequate balance between the pro-
tection of individual rights and the prevention of such activities. 6
Ideally, law enforcement officials should know the extent of their
authority to search property in order to effectively deter criminals
without violating the protections afforded by both the federal and
state constitutions. When the level of intrusiveness is minimal, law
enforcements need only reasonable suspicion for a search to be le-
gal, rather than the more stringent requirement of probable
cause.3 7 It is submitted that the Court of Appeals neglected to con-
sider the minimal level of intrusiveness related to open fields, and
therefore went beyond that which one could consider reasonable.
'1 Cf. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). In Place, the police detained personal
luggage in order to have a trained narcotic dog inspect it. Id. at 698. In determining whether
reasonable suspicion was sufficient to detain the defendant's luggage, the Court held, "We
must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment
interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intru-
sion." Id. at 703; see also People v. Lanahan, 89 A.D.2d 629, 452 N.Y.S.2d 918 (3d Dep't
1982) (stating that determination of whether particular search is to be considered reasona-
ble requires weighing governmental interest in apprehending criminals against individual's
right to privacy); People v. Doerbecker, 48 A.D.2d 120, 125, 367 N.Y.S.2d 976, 980 (2d Dep't
1975) ("Thus to ascertain what constitutes an unreasonable search the court must evaluate
a person's efforts to insure the privacy of an area or activity in view of both contemporary
norms of social conduct and the imperatives of a viable democratic society." (quoting
United States v. Vilholti, 452 F.2d 1186 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972)));
People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 447, 201 N.E.2d 32, 35-36, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458, 463-64 (1964)
(stating only searches constitutionally restricted are unreasonable ones and determination of
reasonableness always involves balancing of interests), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965). But
see Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 488, 593 N.E.2d at 1336, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 928 ("[W]e find trouble-
some . . . the Oliver Court's suggestion that the very conduct discovered by the govern-
ment's illegal trespass[] could be considered as a relevant factor in determining whether the
police had violated defendant's rights.").
The majority in Scott felt compelled to stress that an "after-the-fact" justification
could not be reconciled with New York's practice of recognizing fairness as a fundamental
concern in criminal law jurisprudence. Id.
" See, e.g., People v. Dunn, 77 N.Y.2d 19, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 563 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1990),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2830 (1991). Dunn involved a canine sniff in a corridor outside of the
defendant's door in a search for narcotics. Id. at 20, 564 N.E.2d at 1055, 563 N.Y.S.2d at
389. Although deemed a search under art. I, § 12, the court upheld its validity, subjecting
the police to a standard of reasonable suspicion. Id. at 26, 564 N.E.2d at 1058, 563 N.Y.S.2d
at 392. "Given the uniquely discriminate and nonintrusive nature of such an investigative
device, as well as its significant utility to law enforcement authorities, we conclude that it
may be used without a warrant or probable cause, provided that the police have a reasona-
ble suspicion that a residence contains illicit contraband." Id.; see also Place, 462 U.S. at
703 (explaining that where nature and extent of detention is minimally intrusive seizure
may be based on less than probable cause).
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One effect is that otherwise valid searches of property which result
in little or no individual intrusiveness, such as aerial searches, will
be avoided.3 8 Accordingly, it is submitted that law enforcement's
efforts to fulfill its mandate of preventing and detecting crime will
be unduly hampered.
Under the Scott approach, it is difficult to contemplate any
open field conduct that would not be protected by the mere post-
ing of a sign. The court's decision to protect an individual's legiti-
mate expectation of privacy was undoubtedly correct. However,
standards for determining that legitimacy must also account for
the effectuation of the equally important goals of law enforcement
and protection of society.
Carolyn Austin
31 See People v. Reynolds, 71 N.Y.2d 552, 553, 523 N.E.2d 291, 292, 528 N.Y.S.2d 15, 16
(1988). The court determined that where ground-level police intrusion of open fields is un-
reasonable under the state constitution, police overflight in navigable air space would be
similarly permissible. Id. at 558, 523 N.E.2d at 294, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 18. However, it seems
that the apparent undercutting of Reynolds by the Scott court will have great implications
for the police. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989). The Riley case raised the issue
of whether a greenhouse on private property that bore a "Do Not Enter" sign was protected
from an aerial helicopter search which revealed marihuana growth through a partial cover-
ing. Id. at 447-48. Although the Court recognized that Riley had not intended his green-
house to be open for public inspection, it found that the existence of a partial opening,
which allowed the greenhouse to be viewed from the air, dispelled any reasonable expecta-
tion which the defendant had regarding its contents. Id. at 450. While the Court acknowl-
edged that restrictions should be placed on otherwise valid aerial searches, different stan-
dards should guide the evaluation of these searches due to their lesser level of intrusiveness.
See Eric D. Bender, The Fourth Amendment in the Age of Aerial Surveillance: Curtains
for the Curtilage?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 725, 758 (1985) (providing model approach to guard
against warrantless aerial surveillance, while recognizing effectiveness of method as law en-
forcement tool); David E. Steinberg, Making Sense of Sense-Enhanced Searches, 74 MINN.
L. REv. 563, 568 (1989) (advocating three-part balancing approach to determine whether
police must obtain a warrant prior to conducting sense-enhanced and aerial surveillance).
